ChainCatcher news, according to Binance spot data, the market experienced significant volatility. HYPER rose 22.36% in 24 hours and hit a new high today. At the same time, BABY hit today's low, falling 10.5% in 24 hours. Other tokens such as ROSE, ALPINE, SYN, ORDI, EPIC, MUBARAK, and BROCCOLI714 all experienced a "pump and dump" state, with declines ranging from 5% to 19.94%. Additionally, EUL rose slightly by 3.06% within 5 minutes.

Original Title: The State of Onchain Real-World Assets in Mid-2026 Original Author: insights4vc Original Translation: Deep Tide TechFlow   Deep Tide Introduction: The scale of on-chain tokenized assets looks impressive numerically, but behind it lies a fundamental contradiction—products that can freely circulate often lack real property rights, while products with genuine legal effect lack liquidity. This report uses concrete data to dissect how much of this "$1.89 billion market" is truly solid capital, serving as a sobering must-read for any investor considering positioning in on-chain securities. The stock market has not been moved onto the chain. What has truly emerged is a more credible infrastructure layer—for distributing securities, recording ownership claims, and completing transaction settlements through blockchain-based systems. Data from RWA.xyz shows that the value of distributed tokenized stocks grew from $951 million in March 2026 to $1.89 billion in July, nearly doubling. However, this growth mainly comes from a few products and platforms. The most notable progress comes from regulated market infrastructure, especially Nasdaq’s same CUSIP settlement model and the commercial launch in the DTC program. Liquidity, investor distribution, and independent on-chain price discovery mechanisms remain very limited. Tokenized government bonds continue to show stronger product-market fit, while stock ETFs may scale more easily than individual stocks. Therefore, this market is best understood as a fragmented "Layer 2.5" system: products with the strongest legal foundation often have the weakest liquidity and distribution capabilities; while the most actively traded packaged products usually have the weakest ownership rights. This report updates insights4vc’s March 2026 analysis "The State of Onchain Real-World Assets," focusing on substantive changes since its release. The State of Onchain Real-World Assets Substantive Changes Since March The March report distinguished two types of assets: those recorded on the blockchain and those transferable to external wallets. This distinction remains important. Under RWA.xyz’s framework, "represented assets" remain within the issuer’s or platform’s own environment; "distributed assets" can be transferred externally, although transfers may still be limited to approved or whitelisted wallets. But transferability alone is no longer sufficient to judge a product’s maturity. Since March, offshore products have become more convenient for cross-chain liquidity and use in decentralized markets. Ondo expanded to Ethereum, BNB Chain, and Solana, introduced decentralized routing, and added continuous minting and redemption for some products. xStocks also expanded its distribution channels and collateral integration. Meanwhile, regulated U.S. infrastructure has taken a different path: focusing not on unrestricted portability but on legal certainty, controlled wallets, compliant custody, transfer agent records, and integration with DTC. Chart: Evolution of Various RWA Asset Market Caps 2019–2026 (including tokenized stocks, government bonds, etc.) These two paths solve different problems: offshore packaged products improve accessibility and composability; regulated infrastructure strengthens the connection between tokens and legal ownership claims. "Canonical shares" are the base securities form authorized by issuers, whose transfers are recognized in official ownership systems. They differ fundamentally from third-party tools that only track stock prices or performance. Currently, no product simultaneously achieves all four elements at scale: standard ownership, broad wallet distribution, institutional liquidity, and independent on-chain price discovery. Chart: Onchain Real-World Asset Statistics Summary (as of July 28, totaling about $36.78 billion, with U.S. government bonds accounting for 43.95%) More macro RWA total data also require cautious interpretation. RWA.xyz’s July 29 report data: distributed value $36.81 billion, represented value $218.27 billion. The represented value superficially declined by $124.33 billion, which should not be interpreted as capital outflow or redemption wave. Between the two observation dates, many datasets underwent additions, deletions, reclassifications, or revaluations. These numbers describe the equity value covered by the platform’s methodology at specific points in time, not a measure of investor fund flows. The tokenized stock series is more referential because the same "bridged token value" methodology can be applied to both periods. Even so, the reported 98.5% increase cannot be clearly decomposed into new issuance, price appreciation, and classification adjustments. FGRS provides a useful example. Figure completed fundraising by issuing 4.375 million blockchain shares at $32 each, but the reported value then fluctuates with market price. Without daily minting, burning, and net asset value data for each product, it is impossible to reliably reconstruct net issuance across the entire market. Why the $1.888 billion headline figure is misleading RWA.xyz uses "bridged token value" to measure tokenized stocks, calculated as bridged circulating supply multiplied by net asset value. Circulating supply excludes balances identified as treasury holdings or pre-minted inventory. The bridged figure also excludes tokens locked in known bridging contracts to avoid double counting when an asset is locked on one network and issued on another. This is an effective metric for measuring distributed value but differs from free float shares. Free float shares refer to the portion of securities truly available for public trading after excluding restricted positions, strategic holdings, and concentrated holdings. The timing of data is also important. Asset-level export data shows distributed total value on July 27 as $1.8879 billion, matching the dashboard’s approximately $1.888 billion. Snapshots of platforms and networks on July 29 total about $1.872 billion. The difference of $15.8 million, or 0.84%, aligns with price and token supply changes between the two observation dates. Therefore, this report uses July 27 data for growth calculations of specific instruments and July 29 snapshots for platform and network market shares; the two datasets are not mixed in the same calculation. Chart: Tokenized Stock Details (10 targets, classified by issuing platform and network, FGRS highest at about $191 million) Three named instruments contributed about half the increment: SECZ added $169 million post-listing, FGRS added $162.9 million, STRCx added $126.6 million. Together they contributed $458.6 million, accounting for 49% of the total $936.8 million increase. Long-tail products contributed another $150.5 million, or 16.1% of the increment. These figures reflect changes in distributed value, not investor subscription amounts. SECZ is influenced by both the number of represented shares and Securitize’s NYSE stock price. FGRS reflects issuance, conversion activity, and market price changes. STRCx depends on the circulating supply and value of certificates linked to Strategy’s floating rate preferred stock. Lumping these three growths together as "tokenized stock inflows" merges several economically distinct events into a single potentially misleading figure. Concentration is more evident at the platform level. In the July 29 snapshot, Ondo and xStocks together accounted for 72.7% of distributed value. Adding Securitize raises the top three platforms’ share to 85.1%. Chart: RWA.xyz Platform Rankings—Ondo (45.21%), xStocks (27.51%), Securitize (12.40%) top three Distribution across cross-blockchain networks is more dispersed but does not eliminate underlying common dependencies. Ethereum leads with 36.2% value share, followed by Solana (19.6%) and BNB Chain (15.8%). Provenance and Avalanche are mainly driven by Figure and Securitize respectively. Products issued on different networks may still rely on the same packaging issuer, broker, custodian, securities agent, or reference price provider. Chart: RWA.xyz Network Rankings—Ethereum (36.24%), Solana (19.63%), BNB Chain (15.82%) top three This market has expanded in breadth but remains legally fragmented. Multiple tokens can simultaneously reference Apple stock or the S&P 500 ETF, but each is an independent legal liability, subject to different jurisdictions and relying on different intermediaries. Bridging adjustments prevent the same token from being double counted across networks but cannot—and should not—merge products referencing similar assets yet providing substantively different legal rights.

ChainCatcher news, according to Livecoins report, Brazilian police discovered a hidden illegal Bitcoin mining farm at a scrap metal recycling station during a routine inspection targeting scrap metal theft and fencing. About 15 ASIC miners and 3 servers were seized on site, with the total value of the equipment estimated to exceed 200,000 reais (approximately 39,400 USD). Bitcoin mining itself is not illegal in Brazil, but these devices were stealing electricity. The local power company Cemig estimates a monthly loss of about 60,000 reais (approximately 11,800 USD). A 37-year-old recycling station employee could not explain the source of the equipment nor provide invoices and was arrested on the spot for theft and fencing. The police also filed a case against a 31-year-old male and female couple responsible for the business. The police stated that they are currently investigating the flow of the mined cryptocurrency.

ChainCatcher news, according to Bloomberg, the South Korean KOSPI index plummeted in July, severely impacting a large number of retail investors. Despite the index rebounding a record 18% on Friday, retail investors still recorded a record net sell-off of KOSPI stocks that day; the index fell 22% cumulatively in July, marking the largest monthly drop since the global financial crisis, with the total market capitalization of the South Korean stock market around $3.9 trillion. Driven by President Lee Jae-myung's push for stock market reforms and the launch of single-stock leveraged ETFs, South Korean retail investors bought approximately 78 trillion won (54.2 billion USD) worth of KOSPI stocks from May to June. After the market's sharp decline in July, many investors on social media directed their anger at the government. A Seoul-based investor in their 30s said they first entered the Korean stock market in May and have now decided to "no longer invest in the Korean stock market"; another investor in their 40s, who borrowed 50 million won against their home to trade stocks, criticized the government for launching leveraged ETFs, turning the market into a "casino." During July, the KOSPI triggered circuit breakers and trading halts four times, setting a monthly record. Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix together account for over 50% of the KOSPI weighting, with their stock prices falling 21% and 35% respectively in July; however, since early 2025, Samsung Electronics has still risen more than fourfold, and SK Hynix nearly tenfold. Analysts say this is a typical result of crowded trades combined with leverage, and deleveraging cannot be completed in a few days. Technology and semiconductor stocks may continue to experience significant volatility in the coming months, but this should not be seen as a complete collapse of AI investment logic. The South Korean government suspended new listings of single-stock leveraged ETFs in mid-July and promised to introduce more measures to stabilize the stock market and restrict retail investors' participation in high-risk products. However, the head of the South Korean Shareholders Alliance said that retail investors' anger and criticism toward the government have reached a peak, with many investors believing the related measures came too late.

ChainCatcher news: Roundhill Memory ETF (DRAM) has included CXMT (ChangXin Memory Technologies) in its holdings, with a weight of 2.52%. The DRAM ETF focuses on memory chip companies. As of August 2, the top three holdings of this ETF are Samsung Electronics, Micron Technology, and SK Hynix, with weights of 26.39%, 24.54%, and 22.77%, respectively. Other major holdings include Seagate Technology, Western Digital, SanDisk, Kioxia, Nanya Technology, and GigaDevice.

ChainCatcher news, according to token unlock data from Web3 asset data platform RootData, Avantis (AVNT) will unlock about 29.25 million tokens at 14:00 Beijing time on August 9, valued at approximately 2.43 million USD.

ChainCatcher news, according to token unlock data from Web3 asset data platform RootData, Movement (MOVE) will unlock about 176.74 million tokens at 11:00 AM Beijing time on August 9, valued at approximately 1.33 million USD.

ChainCatcher news, according to token unlock data from the Web3 asset data platform RootData, Mango Network (MGO) will unlock approximately 193.12 million tokens at 9:00 AM Beijing time on August 9, valued at about 1.79 million USD.

ChainCatcher news, according to token unlock data from Web3 asset data platform RootData, STEPN (GMT) will unlock approximately 55.31 million tokens at 8:00 AM Beijing time on August 9, valued at about 2.43 million USD.

Original Title: From corporation to crowd: How organizations evolved through time and technology Original Authors: Tim Sullivan, Robert Hackett, a16z crypto Original Translation: Deep Tide TechFlow   Deep Tide Introduction: From Marco Polo's family trade to the Dutch East India Company, the essence of every commercial revolution has been "how to get strangers to cooperate." This a16z article traces the 500-year evolution of organizational forms and points out the legal dilemmas faced by DAOs—not technical issues, but institutional vacuums. For practitioners considering how Web3 projects can operate within compliance frameworks, this is a background article worth reading carefully. For centuries, the core challenge of business has remained the same: how to get people with different roles, asymmetric information, and conflicting interests to collaborate toward a common goal? The answer has almost always been some form of organizational innovation—a new structure that allocates risk, reward, and responsibility in ways previous generations could not. Business history is also a history of collaboration. The corporate system was the most recent great organizational leap, born for the industrial age, specifically to solve (and exploit) the collaboration problems of that era. But software and internet-native protocols are cutting away the overheads once inevitable for traditional enterprises—multi-layered centralized management, bureaucratic bloat, and intermediation. Existing legal structures were not designed for this new world. Currently, the only strong contender to become the next organizational leap is DUNA—a relatively new entity and the only legal entity explicitly recognized in a once-in-a-generation market structure legislation advancing in the U.S. Congress. It can be said to be the only structure truly built for internet-native organizations. To understand why new organizational forms are emerging today, it is necessary first to recall what problems the corporate system actually solved—and where we are headed. How Merchants Managed Risk Before corporations, business was a private affair: imagine Marco Polo trading long distances with his father and uncle. Such family businesses truly put their lives on the line. If a contract went wrong, personal assets could be wiped out completely—even lives were at risk. Merchants' ventures mainly relied on two types of protection, but neither was guaranteed. The first was geopolitical: the "Mongol Peace" under the Mongol Empire brought relative stability. Offending someone favored by the Mongols meant trouble. The second was social: if you cheated someone, defaulted, or broke the "Lex Mercatoria" (a merchant-enforced code of honor roughly from 1100–1600 AD), your reputation would be ruined, and you would be blacklisted in trade circles from Quanzhou to Timbuktu. In the absence of strong institutions, a merchant's word was truly worth more than gold. The Polo family was relatively fortunate because they relied on blood ties. Many other business partnerships were not so smooth. In the absence of strong institutions, a merchant's word was truly worth more than gold. A long-standing business challenge was the tension between principals and agents; here, between investors and merchants. The medieval "commenda" was an innovation providing limited liability protection: investors only bore losses up to their investment, and merchants theoretically the same. Partners shared profits according to initial contributions. Commenda formed spontaneously, predating any formal regulation. Yet each venture could be overturned by a small storm. This model could not scale: commendas dissolved after a voyage, bankruptcy, or death. A further innovation was Florence's "compagnia"—think Medici Bank. This form was a more durable, operationally complex legal entity than commenda. Companies could maintain long-term multi-party business relationships but were still based on all partners' personal liability. This was the most advanced pre-corporate tool in the Middle Ages—the peak of medieval partnership—but still exposed partners to risk. The Church and universities long enjoyed legal personality derived from the Roman "universitas" concept (treating collectives as single legal persons), but commercial enterprises lacked fully independent legal identity. These flaws were only resolved in the 17th century when early modern Europe invented something new. This innovation and its legal protections made it easier for enterprises to raise capital, distribute ownership through stock issuance, and protect owners from liability—this was the corporation. These corporate powers were famously granted to the Dutch East India Company (VOC: Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie), a revelation that quickly spread across Europe once people realized how good corporations were. (Though the British East India Company was founded a few years earlier than the VOC, its system was far less mature, raising funds only for specific voyages and lacking a public share issuance mechanism.) By reducing operational risk and coordination costs, the corporate system made large-scale, capital-intensive enterprises possible—and shaped much of the modern world. The Cost of Scale While solving real problems, corporations also brought new issues. Their first achievement was to make participants care about each other's outcomes: by binding shareholders, directors, and captains into the same legal entity and profit line, corporations forced parties to internalize costs they might otherwise recklessly externalize. But common interests do not equal perfectly aligned incentives. Take the VOC as an example: its legal form was familiar yet complex. Shareholders included many Dutch citizens eager for returns but too busy with their own lives to oversee VOC's daily operations or macro strategy. The board, the "Seventeen Gentlemen" (Heeren XVII), planned how to make money for all. Captains and merchants on the Southeast Asia front had to make the best decisions for the company with limited information and resources. In theory, yes. In reality, the interests of these three parties were not fully aligned; one could sacrifice others' interests to gain more for themselves. Common interests do not equal perfectly aligned incentives. How to ensure captains, far from the Seventeen Gentlemen's supervision, would not plunder other ships or abscond with funds? Prevent merchants from taking bribes or making bigger private deals? Ensure the board made the right decisions? If you were a group of Protestant shareholders unhappy with VOC's sometimes predatory behavior, what could you do? These questions spawned various incentive design innovations—options, dividends, audits, oversight, even so-called efficiency wages—and new legal protections enforced by the state to ensure fair competition. Of course, they also spawned countless abuses. However! The corporate system, evolving over time, remains our best tool for coordinating incentives, reducing collaboration costs, generating profits, and protecting all participants. Shortly after the U.S. was founded, corporations were authorized by special legislation but initially rare. The First Bank of the United States, chartered by Congress in 1791, was the earliest and most famous case. New York introduced the first general corporation law in 1811. By mid-19th century, more states allowed corporations to be registered without special acts, and the concept of "limited liability" gradually standardized. The industrial wave in the late 19th century saw an explosion in corporations, culminating in the landmark 1899 Delaware General Corporation Law. Cooperatives emerged in the 19th century as another option. They explored a different coordination scheme: member ownership and democratic governance. Farmers, consumers, workers, and credit cooperatives used cooperatives to bind participants' interests more directly to the organization. Cooperatives succeeded in some areas, like agriculture (e.g., Land O'Lakes), but remained specialized overall. Meanwhile, corporations grew more popular. Another option was the limited liability company, LLC. Though LLCs had earlier precedents like Germany's GmbH or the UK's Ltd., the LLC itself appeared relatively late: Wyoming only codified it in 1977. Before that, corporations offered limited liability but were rigid and faced double taxation, while partnerships were flexible but exposed participants to personal risk. LLCs combined the best of both—limited liability plus pass-through taxation—making them suitable for many small businesses. Today, LLCs are the default form for many startups, small businesses, and investment vehicles. Since then, a series of small variants appeared: limited liability partnerships (LLP, 1991), low-profit limited liability companies (L3C, 2008), benefit corporations (2010), and more. These are undoubtedly useful refinements for specific purposes. But every so often, technology changes the boundaries of possibility, spawning revolutionary new forms by comparison. DAO and Its Dilemma Decentralization is such a revolutionary idea: large groups coordinating without centralized management or trusted intermediaries. Before crypto—especially before Satoshi Nakamoto invented blockchain—this possibility was more philosophical than practical. One of crypto's earliest great innovations was the DAO, or decentralized autonomous organization. A DAO is an organization governed by software-coded rules, collectively managed by participants rather than a central authority. No centralized management team or board, no Seventeen Gentlemen. But decentralized governance is hard. Getting token holders to vote on important issues has proven harder than individual shareholders voting for board members—whose turnout is already dismally low, comparable to U.S. municipal elections. Ensuring power does not concentrate in a few token holders is equally challenging. Recent legal environments have exacerbated these challenges. Unfortunately, the previous U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission refused to provide clear rules for crypto projects while weaponizing ambiguity through aggressive enforcement. Entrepreneurship struggles to grow amid uncertainty; even with clear rules, operating is hard enough. Entrepreneurship struggles to grow amid uncertainty; even with clear rules, operating is hard enough. The core legitimacy issue is one of the "Howey Test" criteria—the SEC's standard for determining whether an instrument is a security: (1) investment of money; (2) common enterprise; (3) profits derived entirely from others' efforts. For public companies, "others' efforts" include the management running the company. For crypto projects and their DAOs, the SEC believes ongoing protocol development—even if done by a group of unrelated people who may or may not hold tokens—subjects related tokens to securities law, making broad participation and on-chain trading impossible. Equally important, because DAOs lack formal state recognition, project owners cannot obtain any of the protections mentioned above, such as limited liability. In other words, DAO members may face unlimited personal liability, legally reducing crypto governance almost to medieval levels. Thus, crypto projects act on lawyers' advice. They set up foundations overseas as independent entities to oversee ongoing protocol development, severing ties between that work and U.S. business. Or they establish operating entities outside the U.S. Both "solutions" harm U.S. innovation capacity, employment, and tax revenue. Offshore crypto foundations, to put it nicely, are workarounds. These lawyer-crafted compromises shift power and ongoing development to an "independent" entity hoping to evade securities regulation. This strategy is understandable in a hostile regulatory era but exposes deep flaws: foundations have weak incentive coordination, limited growth-driving ability, and inevitably tend to consolidate control. But when projects are caught between "being sued by the SEC" and "building a strange organizational structure that creates incentive misalignment," what choice do they have? This is why DUNA—decentralized unincorporated nonprofit association—is so important. It draws on a long history of business structure and governance design, pursuing the common goal of all enterprises: efficiently coordinating people around a shared purpose. But it does so without relying on centralized management control, reducing principal-agent problems and information asymmetry common in traditional corporations. For this reason, DUNA departs from a core assumption of the Howey Test: that participants rely on others' managerial efforts to create value.³ Groups Gain Their Own Legal Form Before DUNA, organizing and governing crypto projects had only three options: DAOs lacked legal recognition, exposing members to potentially ruinous liability; traditional corporate entities forced projects into unsuitable hierarchies and faced SEC enforcement; offshore foundations were legally and operationally cumbersome, pushing much of the industry overseas. Until recently, no clear way existed for a group of users to govern decentralized networks while enjoying some corporate protections—a form of organization blockchain technology has only just made possible. Now there is. Simply put, DUNA turns a group of people into a legal entity. Three states—Alabama, West Virginia, and Wyoming—have passed laws authorizing this new business structure. It combines the legal advantages of existing organizational forms with decentralized control capabilities, fundamentally different from traditional corporations and never before truly realized by any entity. Simply put, DUNA turns a group of people into a legal entity. What protections does DUNA specifically provide? Its powers include legal personality, limited liability, perpetual existence, and state government recognition—core elements that enable modern corporations to operate. Recognizing a group's "legal personality" allows the entity to enter contracts on behalf of participants; limited liability ensures members are not personally responsible for organizational obligations. Together, these features enable large, loosely connected groups to collaborate—raising capital, holding assets, hiring managers, paying taxes, making deals—without exposing members to excessive risk or ruinous liability. Organizational forms do not take root overnight; they spread slowly through competition among states, lawyers becoming familiar, and entrepreneurs gaining trust. Before Delaware became the preferred state for corporate registration, New Jersey was dominant;⁴ today, Texas and Nevada are catching up. LLCs were first approved in Wyoming, and after tax treatment was clarified, had spread to all 50 states by 1997. As for DUNA, Wyoming again acted as a pioneer, legislating it in March 2024. Crypto protocols and communities including Uniswap Governance and Nouns DAO have adopted it first. Just as the corporate system gave large enterprises their first native form, DUNA is giving open, internet-scale decentralized networks their own legal form. A New Era of Organizational Design Think of DUNA as a legal shell that allows decentralized network governance mechanisms to conduct business without introducing traditional centralized management. It builds on the unincorporated nonprofit association (UNA) foundation—a legal framework adopted by 17 states and Washington D.C. that helps groups like homeowners' associations, civic groups, recreational sports leagues, religious congregations, and hobby clubs organize legally. UNA provides lightweight governance without the heavy structure of corporations or LLCs, allowing these groups to hold property, enter contracts, and sue or be sued in the entity's name.⁵ Just as the corporate system did not replace all partnerships, DUNA will not replace everything that came before. DUNA is similar: it allows a group of token holders or contributors to govern via on-chain rules or token-based voting without relying on a board or management team. Members enjoy limited liability protection, separating entity obligations from personal assets; the organization can be understood and engaged by courts, regulators, and counterparties. But DUNA does not solve all problems. It cannot eliminate governance challenges, guarantee decentralization (though DAOs must have at least 100 active members to qualify), or magically bypass securities laws. What it truly does is fill a specific gap: making decentralized organizations legally recognized entities. From informal merchant networks, to partnerships, to corporations, to LLCs, and now DAOs, each new organizational technology has emerged when new coordination modes were needed. DUNA may mark the start of a new era in organizational design evolution. But just as the corporate system did not replace all partnerships, DUNA will not replace everything that came before. It simply expands the menu of options. And for the first time, it allows decentralized networks to be represented by fully identifiable legal entities. For most of human history, scaling an organization—even a small one—meant taking on huge personal risk. Bold entrepreneurs like the Polo family relied on family, reputation, and fragile customs, always vulnerable to ruin from a single shipwreck.⁶ The corporate system changed this equation, separating entrepreneurial fate from that of the individuals behind it. DUNA extends this separation into a new realm: community governance of blockchain-based decentralized networks. Now, even a loosely organized group of strangers on the internet can act as a single entity—signing agreements, holding assets, bearing risks—without any participant betting their livelihood. In this sense, it is a new answer to one of the oldest questions in business history. Acknowledgments: Thanks to Aiden Slavin, Alejandro Flores, Miles Jennings, Scott Duke Kominers, Sonal Chokshi, and Steph Zinn for valuable feedback and edits. Any errors remain the authors' responsibility. Cooperatives seem spiritually aligned with internet-native organizations like DAOs, but cooperatives assume a relatively stable, identifiable membership and hierarchical leadership structure, which many decentralized networks lack. Interestingly, another major U.S. contribution—corporate bankruptcy law—was not widely adopted globally for a long time. This legal code, embedding the idea that "a person can take risks, fail, reorganize, and try again," is an engine of American dynamism. Wyoming tried to address this in 2021 by allowing DAOs to organize as LLCs. But LLCs still assume a clear member list, K-1 tax filings, and profit motives. While suitable for some small investment clubs, LLCs are awkward for a nonprofit mission-driven, permissionless, anonymously membered network and offer little help solving the Howey problem—whether member interests themselves constitute securities. That said, it was only when then-New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson suppressed his state's business-friendly registration laws that Delaware inadvertently gained a big advantage. Trusts superficially seem natural vehicles for decentralized groups but are actually unsuitable. Trusts are designed around identifiable trustees and beneficiaries, an awkward fit for organizations deliberately pursuing decentralized governance. By the way, Marco Polo once commanded a Venetian warship in a war between rival trading powers, was captured and imprisoned in Genoa, and it was in prison that he narrated his famous travelogue.